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THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM 
   
 
Abstract : This paper builds on the case study of the birth and death of the fixed exchange rate system in 
Western Europe, prior to the launch of the Euro. The analysis of this case aims to highlight how "new" 
international economic institutions may suffer the processes of "preference reversals" and thereby implode. 
De facto, the paper focuses on the cognitive factors that are deemed to have played an important role in 
determining the originating decision-making processes in favour of a system of fixed exchange rates and, 
then, in determining the abandonment of that system. After briefly explaining events such as the "currency 
snake" and the "European Monetary System” (EMS), the paper highlights how processes of this nature are 
conditional on the extent of the limits of rationality of the decision-making agents, with the consequence of 
producing cognitive imbalances. These imbalances are determined by the "fuzziness" with which agents 
evaluate not only opposing objectives, in particular those of employment and the balance of payments, but 
especially objectives achievable in an intertemporal dimension (Walliser, 2008: ch. 4).  
In fact, we illustrate how the actual inflationary differentials between the countries concerned determine the 
imbalances in the balances of payments. We also highlight how the policies to bring inflation under control 
can determine changes in the electorate in the preferences defined in the area of economic policies. The 
collapse of the monetary snake and the European Monetary System is representative of such a change in 





Modern analysis of the formation processes of social and economic institutions is largely based, especially 
when using models based on the game theory, on the assumption that the emergence of a new institution or, 
if  preferred,  of  a  new  rule  of  socially  accepted  conduct,  is  the  result  of  a  rational  evaluation,  i.e.,  a 
comparative evaluation of costs and benefits arising from the new institution and costs and benefits arising 
from maintaining the old institution (Buchanan and Tullock,1962). It follows that rational evaluation can 
also be the result of a comparative calculation of costs and benefits, extended on multiperiodal time horizons 
as appropriate, by virtue of which general agent, j, part of set, N, of subjects linked together by a defined  tie 
calculates the convenience obtained in maintaining, or abandoning, a rule of conduct pursued until then, in 
respect of a new rule of conduct. This, in accordance with  Bicchieri (1997: 21), who wrote, "rational choice 
theory defines action as the outcome of a practical inference that takes preferences and beliefs as premises". 
When referring to rules of social conduct, the choice of a rule is conditioned by the choices that the other n-1 
agents may make. This is highlighted, for example, by models resulting from the concept of "prisoner's 
dilemma", in which every agent, i , with i=1,2,.j .,n, is able to make a comparative calculation of costs and 
payoffs arising from the strategies that may conditionally follow the strategies of the other n -1 agents. 
The  "computational  capacity",  is  an  important  component  of  decision-making  processes,  both  those  of 
individual agents and those of collective agents. It goes without  saying that the analysis of a collective 
agent’s computational capacity (which may, for example, be the government of a state) leads to the area of 
the contracts  theory, where the question of information structures of both the principals (voters) and of 
agents (governments) exercises a fundamental role, as well as leading to the area of collective choice theory 
(Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). Governments are called to take decisions, formally on behalf of the voters, 
based on an information universe, which in general does not necessarily coincide with one that voters are in 
possession of. Furthermore, it should be noted that the elaboration of objectives, synthesizable into a useful 
collective function, must take account, however, of the different preferences of the individuals who that same 
government represents, with the known difficulties, in the case of at least three objectives, and at least three 
agents (Ordershook, 1986 : 61) that are emphasized in Arrow’s (1951) impossibility theorem. Finally, it 
should be pointed out that in choices relating to international economic institutions, if governments generally 
have an informational universe that is greater than that of the voters’, it is also true that the information   2 
universe  is  not  necessarily  complete,  and  therefore  the  decisions  are  made  on  the  basis  of  bounded 
informations on the relation between such choices and the possible payoffs arising from them, under the 
constraint of a bounded computational capacity and significant cognitive distortions. I shall expand on this. 
The  problem  associated  with  Arrow’s  impossibility  theorem  can  formally  be  surmounted  by  imposing 
restrictive conditions to the structure of the collective utility functions of the voters of a country, reducing 
them to mono-argument functions, in this way the choice of strategy proposed in that country can be made 
through the voting system. Therefore, governments, called to negotiate monetary regulations, must identify 
the  rule  on  which  to  agree,  considering  the  constraints  assigned  them  by  their  voters.  International 
agreements have the purpose of regulating situations that will occur in the future; this is why the question of 
cognitive  imperfections  of  the  subjects  involved  is  important.  Indeed,  because  of  these  cognitive 
imperfections it will be difficult for them to make perfect forecasts on the future states of the world. In this 
regard,  we  recall  Furobotn  and  Richter  (2000:  180):  “imperfect  foresight  has  the  effect  of  making  it 
impossible to enumerate and contract upon conceivable contingencies that the future will bring”.  
A possible solution to the problem of identifying equilibria solutions in the multi-periode context, is the use 
of the temporary equilibrium method (Furobotn and Richter, 2000: 180), by virtue of which it is possible to 
represent, with sufficient logical coherence, the changes which may occur in the choice of strategies. In fact, 
the computational limits and cognitive distortions of both principals and agents, may sometimes result in the 
failure of the ex novo rules established and a return to the rules that were changed. This was the case of the 
monetary union project, from the end of the Second World War up to the collapse of the European Monetary 




2. From the Monetary Snake to the EMS. A case study  
 
Standard economic literature on the costs and benefits of monetary cooperation strategies on an international 
level is infinite, not to mention, that which is dedicated to examining the birth of the Euro. Broadly speaking, 
in the literature, the rules that are put in place based on a money market functioning, performing forms more 
or less driven by cooperation between different governments, are viewed as constraints chosen by agents 
based on preferences given and defined on the space of economic policy actions, K. Nevertheless, in the case 
of international monetary institutions, rarely is the possibility referred to that, a process of interaction (with 
some form of circular causation) occurs between cognitive processes and the choices of institutions, although 
this interaction - on a general level- is beginning to become the subject of more detailed analyses (Engel and 
Weber, 2007). I believe that from this interdependence the possibility should derive that forms of "preference 
reversal" come about relative to the rules adopted. The reason I focus attention on the events resulting from 
the  process  of  the  European  monetary  integration  is  that  these  were,  from  1972  to  1992,  a  significant 
example of how the propensity to monetary cooperation between European countries met with real failures. 
These failures will be analyzed in terms of dynamic inconsistency between actual plans and behaviour in the 
future, paying attention to cognitive factors that may contribute to determine this inconsistency. A previous 
paper of mine (Mistri, 2007) shows how the emergence of a perfectly integrated European trade system 
involves the consolidation of an Inter-European monetary and financial system focused on the stability of 
exchange rates and monetary policy regulations that can turn into genuine "constitutions". This is a central 
issue in discussions that were held in the 1970s and 1980s in Western Europe; in these debates, there were 
two intertwining issues, namely that of achieving full employment and that of the exchange rate stability 
between European currencies. This is a duplicity of objectives, which, for example, emerges in the Werner 
Commission report published in 1970. According to the Werner Report, the basis of a monetary union must 
be the total and irreversible convertibility of the currencies and, therefore, the elimination of the exchange 
rate fluctuation margins obtained through the irrevocable fixing of parity rates. 
In the Werner report, a hypothesis of the creation of a single currency, as an alternative to the hypothesis of 
fixing foreign exchange rates, had already been proposed. At that stage the two strategic options suggested 
were considered theoretically replaceable by one another in the sense that it was hoped that the same effects 
would manifest themselves, albeit with the conviction that a system of fixed exchange rates could not have 
borne, in the long term, the pressure on the economic policies of individual governments that would have 
occurred both as a result of unfavourable events and following the resurgence of new and stronger national 
propensities to inflation. 
   3 
The Werner Commission, at the time, already revealed a serious concern regarding the ability of national 
governments to keep faith with commitments made on that matter. 
At the same time, it was apparent that the option of a single currency would not have received the full 
consent  of  governments,  which,  however,  were  worried  about  the  adverse  effects,  at  least  in  the  
medium/long term, that the policies necessary to maintain a single currency would have on employment 
levels in each country. Studies on so-called "optimum currency areas" Mundell (1961), had identified the 
preconditions that could ensure the proper functioning of an integrated monetary market. However, to many 
analysts  these  preconditions  seemed  unrealistic  given  the  structure  of  national  labour  markets  and  the 
diversity in national propensities to  inflation. For example, following Meade (1952), Dehem (1972) denied 
that the national governments knew to resist the political consequences of unemployment, which he counted 
among the negative consequences of a monetary union, at least in the short term. Among other things, 
Dehem emphasized that the sufficient conditions identified by Mundell, such as labour and capital mobility 
within the area, could not be met in Europe. 
The same debate on optimum currency areas revealed how the utility functions of  governments may be 
focused on two possible strategic options: a first option focused on the rule of "floating exchange rates", 
aimed at achieving higher levels of employment in the short term; (b) the second option focused on the rule 
of "fixed exchange rates", designed to maintain exchange rates stable between their European currencies. In 
short,  it  is  possible  that  governments  adopt  a  rule  that  is  a  mix  of  the  two  previous  rules,  aimed  at 
maintaining exchange rates sufficiently stable within a determined fluctuation band, in order to reconcile the 
possibility of achieving higher levels of employment with what, to use an oxymoron, might be called a 
"flexible" exchange rate stability. This latter rule, used in the case of the EMS, appears problematic as it ends 
up being unstable, so much so as to bring about the abandonment of the objective of exchange rate stability. 
The particular attention paid to the objective of full employment versus that of currency stability was also 
due to the crisis triggered by the 1973 and 1974 oil shocks; in fact, in debates kindled in the 1970s in 
connection with the approach of the optimal currency areas, it emerged that the objective of full employment 
and that of the exchange rate stability end up appearing, essentially, as alternatives.  
In concrete terms, the choices of the Commission and those of the governments unravel amidst Keynesian 
propensities towards more active policies concerning employment and the more "orthodox" calls to the fight 
against inflation and the commitment to the exchange rate stability. In this respect in 1972, the governments 
of  the  six  founding  countries  of  the  European  Common  Market  (ECM)  gave  life  to  a  system  of  joint 
fluctuations of their currencies against the dollar, with a determined fluctuation band (monetary snake); this 
system lasted until March 1973. After a period of substantial currency anarchy in Europe, an attempt to 
revive a monetary system based on some form of cooperation between governments was made. In 1979, the 
European  Economic  Community  (EEC)  gave  life  to  the  European  Monetary  System  (EMS),  with  the 
objective of creating a common currency, but based on a system of floating exchange rates within a tight 




3. From one institution to another. The role of cognitive disequilibrium 
 
The fluctuation trend of the choices made, in the period concerned, by the European governments in terms of 
policies concerning currencies, can be regarded as an example of the institutional crisis mentioned by Aoki 
(2001: 241), according to whom, the transition from a system of rules to another should be seen as the result 
of a general cognitive disequilibrium; in other words, the result of a lack of consistency between structural 
results expected and actual results. In connection with this Aoki (2001: 239)  wrote “when an existing sets of 
rules does not produce satisfactory results relative to an agent’s aspirations, the agents may  start questioning 
the relevancy as well usefulness of their own subjective games”. 
In particular, when such an imbalance manifests itself, which can no longer be reabsorbed by the protection 
mechanisms of the system of dominant rules, the agents can be induced to review the rules adopted earlier 
and to seek some entirely new ones. Aoki assumes that the search for new rules, within the framework of a 
problem solving based approach, can be implemented by Schumpeterian type players whose actions are 
directed towards finding solutions to problems which do not seem to be able to be solved with existing 
institutions (op cit.). In Aoki’s vision the loss of consistency between results expected and actual results, in 
general, is a consequence of the dynamic effects resulting from radical changes in the outer environment to   4 
which  the  adaptation  processes  of  the  behaviours  adopted  by  the  agents  themselves  do  not  necessarily 
correspond. 
At  the  base  of  the  issues  cited  by  Aoki,  there  are  also  however,  cognitive  factors  determined  by  the 
difficulties that the agents (in our case the governments and central banks of the countries concerned by the 
currency coordination policies) have in assessing the dynamic factors of the economy. The dynamics of the 
fundamental  economic  variables  are  not  accurately  predictable  and  this  depends  on  both  the  imperfect 
knowledge of agents and from cognitive constraints that limit their computational ability (Simon, 1972).  To 
this can be added that, within the general cognitive disequilibrium, the difficulties of understanding the real 
meaning to be allocated to signals coming from counterparties also play a role. It is therefore possible that an 
institution’s choice made in the initial phase of the period of the finite time, ∆t1, results in regret in the final 
phase of that period (Loomes and Sugden, 1982). In some cases, this regret may bring the agents to review, 
in the following period, ∆t2, their own decisions to the point of using a different rule. 
The assumption that I make here, to a certain extent, is in line with the analysis carried out by Hodgson in 
“Economics And Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics” (1988). Hodgson’s recall 
to the role played by cognitive processes in the formation of social institutions is to be wholly recuperated 
for analysis of the formative processes of international economic institutions, considering the preference 
systems of voters and governments. I have already affirmed that one and the other are able to derive a system 
of preferences, defined on the space of actions of economic policy, K. For operational simplification, it can 
be assumed that the preferences of a national government coincide with the preferences of its electorate; in 
the same way that it can be assumed that the knowledge and beliefs of a national government coincide with 
the knowledge and beliefs of its electorate. 
In determining the objectives and constraints, the agents, to a certain extent, are inspired by the theoretical 
models dominant in each phase of the period concerned: (a) in the first phase they are inspired by Keynesian 
type models, with their function of collective preference for two arguments in which dominant weight is 
assigned  to  one  of  the  two  -  full  employment;  in  the  second  phase  they  are  substantially  inspired  by 
monetarist type models, with their function of collective preference for an argument, or objective, i.e. the 
exchange rate stability. Nevertheless, the problem of the computational and information limits of  agents 
remains to be solved; Sargent (1993), amongst others, spoke of these computational limits, while on the 
question of incomplete information in monetary policies we refer you to Issing and Tristani (2005). Sargent 
considers that the concept of bounded rationality should be introduced in macro-economic analysis as an 
operational  strategy  necessary  to  exit  from  the  logical  contradictions  of  models  based  on  rational 
expectations. In fact, rational expectations impose two conditions on economic models: (a) the Olympic 
rationality  of  individuals;  (b)  mutual  consistency  of  the  perceptions  concerning  the  outer  environment. 
Sometimes the idea of rational expectations is explained informally assuming that it reflects a process in 
which individuals, through observation, learn to eliminate their forecasting errors. In this respect Sargent 
(1993: 21) notes that the formal estimation and inferential procedures of the econometric models which 
incorporate the rational expectations assume that the theoretical agents know subjects and dynamics that the 
econometricians restrict themselves to estimate. 
There is, therefore, an asymmetry between the forecasting capacity of the theoretic homo economicus and 
that of the model that should describe the behaviour. Sargent considers that it is possible to eliminate the 
asymmetry using the principle of bounded rationality, with which the need to impose the condition of mutual 
consistency of the perceptions of subjects is eliminated. The consequences of abandoning the hypothesis of 
rational  expectations  are  immediate  if  you  think,  for  example,  that  the  theoretical  monetarist  approach 
structure  and  the  model  of  optimum  monetary  policy  depend  largely  on  this  hypothesis.  For  example, 
following this approach Kydland and Prescott (1977) claim that, in the presence of rational expectations, the 
optimal policy is one that sets, a priori, a rule that requires public action in subsequent periods with respect to 
the rule fixed initially, preventing them from changing later. If, however, one were to assume, as I do, that 
the expectations are conditioned by the computational limits of agents and by incomplete information, then it 
is clear that those expectations may not be "rational" in the sense of Munth (1961).  It therefore becomes 
difficult to maintain, in time, the rule set initially. In this way, the consequences on determining an optimum 
time horizon are immediate.  
According to Sargent (1993. p 22), to eliminate the asymmetry that exists between what homo economicus 
knows and what economists estimate, the limits that the economist is subject to should be assigned to the 
very  same  homo  economicus.  For  example,  homo  economicus  could  be  likened  to  the  "classic 
econometrician", who is certain of the model but is uncertain on the values to be allocated to the parameters. 
In particular, Sargent’s analysis, which reverts to Kreps (1990), assumes that one element of weakness in the   5 
rational expectations approach is the fact that this approach is mainly oriented to defining the environmental 
conditions that lead to a point of equilibrium, known as the attractor point. However, as Kreps noted (op cit), 
developments of the game theory show that in some cases there may be a multiplicity of equilibria and 
therefore players must choose from amongst these equilibria; the question to then put is in which way players 
choose one equilibrium over another. In this regard, Kreps believes that the answer should be sought in the 
behaviour  of  individuals  who  move  in  conditions  of  limited  rationality,  therefore  learning  from  past 
experience and adjusting their strategies from time to time. The reflections of Kreps and Sargent probably 
have more of a “questions” than “answers” flavour. However, for our purposes, the answer to the problem 
presently outlined should be sought in the fact that players of an imaginary game of strategy are inclined to 
use techniques that are intended to resolve a "current" coordination problem using substantially analogous 
schemes that do not always ensure a sufficient capacity for "processing" the information available in order to 




4. Bounded rationality and chaotic dynamics in the 1970s and 1980s  
 
Thus, the computational bounds of agents together with incomplete information, in a context of strategy 
games can lead to the failure of finding a stable equilibrium. Therefore, those same agents could challenge an 
equilibrium  found  in  such  a  context,  once  the  results  have  been  verified,  in  the  event  that  they  are 
unsatisfactory and give rise to “regret" phenomena. As will be seen further on, I make the emergence of 
regret phenomena dependant on the logical structure of bounded rationality and, in particular, the ratio of 
chaotic dynamics that have arisen in the market and the consequent difficulties to process the information in 
a coherent and rational way. In this specific case, it should be noted that the difficulty of obtaining consistent 
forecasts of the evolution of economic and financial systems of the main European countries, obliges the 
governments and the national central banks to make forecasts in the short/medium-term subject to revision. 
This is an approach that, in fact, may find its theoretical framework of reference in a temporary equilibrium 
scheme.  
Thus,  bounded  rationality  and  temporary  equilibria  represent  the  conceptual  framework  to  interpret  the 
situation of the European economies that manifested itself following publication of the Werner Report. 
The  events that  happened,  for  example,  between  1968  and  1974,  made it  impossible  for  any  European 
government and for any European Central Bank to make reliable forecasts in relation to the currency and 
labour market dynamics. In 1970 convertibility of the dollar against gold fell. The 1973 and 1974 oil shocks 
triggered inflation first from the cost side and subsequently from the demand side. The short/medium term 
being the only reasonable term in which to frame the reaction strategies of the governments and central 
banks of Western Europe. In this context, it would not have made sense to speak of equilibria in the long 
term nor of monetary policies that would necessarily have had as their conceptual reference such a long-term 
equilibrium. Amongst other things, the scheme to which I refer assumes that the imbalances between two or 
more balances of payments are determined by the manifestation of differentials in national inflation rates. On 
the other hand, I hypothesize that national levels of labour productivity remain sufficiently constant in time 
because of the continuing inertial forces of an institutional nature (the role of unions, structure of public 
expenditure), whereby no adjustments in production scales will manifest themselves in any of the national 
production systems. The lack of adjustment of this nature determines, for each period of time, the equality 
between the long-term national supply function and the short-term national supply function. It follows that it 
is possible to consider the dynamics of national economic systems as a succession of temporary equilibria 
that can be modified only by any changes in the national rates of inflation. 
The inflationary dynamics that intensely affect the economies of some European countries are complex, in 
that, the causes of the inflationary processes that have plagued the economies of the main European countries 
in the period concerned are manifold. Amongst them, we can identify the following: (a) inflation from costs, 
following the oil shocks; (b) inflation from costs arising from wage increases exceeding the average labour 
productivity gains; (c) inflation arising from asymmetries in the bargaining power of various social groups 
and  pressure  groups,  with  a  consequent  increase  in  public  spending  and  debt.  These  are  inflationary 
processes that results in the growth of prices expressed in monetary terms.  
The complexity of this phenomenon and all the intertwining causes, may explain, at least to some extent, the 
governments’ and European central banks’ oscillation between a propensity to use expansion of aggregate 
demand policies and a propensity to use inflation containment strategies. The two policies, as demonstrated,   6 
characterize  objectives  that  are  not  easily  compatible  and  correspondingly  identify  two  fundamental 
exchange rate models. 
As seen, the choice of establishing the EMS is aimed at achieving the objectives of full employment and 
exchange  rate  stability,  without  excluding  an  attempt  to  mediate  between  them.  There  is  of  course  the 
possibility that, in time, real reversals in preferences make themselves known. These changes can result from 
an error in estimating the short and medium-term effects that a deflationary policy can have on the welfare of 
the voters. In other words, it is possible that the governments underestimate the medium-term negative 
effects and underestimate the short-term positive effects of such a policy; these are known respectively as the   
overconfidence  and underconfidence phenomena. For this reason, it may also be useful to speak in terms of 
“temporary equilibria", because in this way it is possible to adequately represent the sequence of stages that 
such a process has gone through with the corresponding changes of preferences to the rules of conduct. 
In the field of international monetary policy, the problems of bounded rationality of agents (governments 
and/or European central banks) may implicate those fluctuations in the choice of behavioural models referred 
to. It  may be useful to refer to  Issing and Tristani (2005)  who expose the existence of a gap between 
economic theory models and the problems of the real world with respect to monetary policy management. 
Referring to the European monetary integration, Issing and Tristani bring to light that "there are episodes 
where the level of uncertainty reached exceptional heights and the limitation of knowledge emerged most 
strikingly. However, extensive one's knowledge of the economy before such events, it is possibly irrelevant 




5. The monetary regime and the set of objectives   
 
It must necessarily be assumed that the stability of a system of fixed exchange rates is based on the capacity 
of individual governments to maintain the exchange rate values between the respective national currencies. 
For this to be the case, the economic, fiscal and monetary policies of individual governments must be able to 
ensure adequate control of national inflationary dynamics. If there are no supranational tools to maintain this 
control, it must be entrusted to the choice of individual national governments. The significant difficulties in 
the  European  monetary  integration  process  based  on  fixed  exchange  rate  systems  resulted  in  structural 
imbalances in the balances of payments. One of the causes of these structural imbalances is represented by 
diversity  in  national  propensities  to inflation. The  propensity  to  national inflation  concisely  reflects the 
choices that each national government  makes in the area of economic policy. These  choices reflect the 
structural  differences  that  exist  between  the  collective  preference  functions  of  the  individual  national 
governments in their public spending policies, tax policies, and so on. The creation of a fixed exchange rate 
system consequently entails that the individual governments agree to adopt monetary, fiscal and economic 
policies capable of guaranteeing the convergence of national rates of inflation to values that fall satisfactorily 
around a value negotiated previously. Moreover, it goes without saying that the governments of countries 
with  high  inflationary  propensity  should  be  able  to  ensure  stability  of  the  equilibrium  that  might 
appropriately be reached, creating in the event, institutions that "tie their hands". (Giavazzi and Pagano, 
1988).  In  fact,  the  governments  of  countries  with  high  inflationary  propensity  are  not  always  able  to 
guarantee  the commitment made, especially if they are called upon to mediate between two short to medium 
term objectives that are deemed conflicting, i.e. the objective of full employment and exchange rate stability. 
It follows that the choice and permanence of one or other system of exchange rates derives from the structure 
and the evolution of the functions of collective preference of the individual governments that are committed 
to building an integrated monetary area. We saw, in the period of the history of the European monetary 
integration  considered,  that  the  preference  functions  of  policies  concerning  currency  usually  had  two 
objectives, in the sense that they tried to incorporate both objectives of full employment and exchange rate 
stability. These are objectives, which, especially in the short/medium term, are difficult to reconcile since the 
aim  of  full  employment,  particularly  in  the  short/medium  term,  may  increase  the  national  inflation 
propensity, generating an imbalance in the balance of payments. In fact, the trade-off between inflation and 
production (employment) can be found on every short-term aggregate supply curve. To reduce inflation it is 
necessary to reduce the level of demand negatively affecting production levels, generating a recession that 
impedes wages growth through an increase in unemployment. 
In general it can be assumed that a generic government, Gj, is called to derive a utility function, uj, defined 
on the space of institutional rules, K, such that uA :K →R , a function that incorporates the two fundamental   7 
objectives of full employment and exchange rate stability. I have indicated these objectives with x1  and  x2, 
so that the utility function is of a multi-objective kind (Goodwin and Wright, 2004: 123 et seq). It may be 
expressed as uj =(k1 x1 , k2 x2 ), where k1  and  k2  are the possible values, or weights, which are assigned to 
the two "rules", or objectives. The problem that the government  has to resolve is that of allocating the 
weights, k1 and k2  to the two objectives; standardizing to obtain  k1+ k2 = 1. The weight assigned to each 
objective  reflects  the  system  of  preferences  of  economic  policy  of the  government.  For  example, for a 
government  to  allocate    k1  =  1  and    k2  =  0  means  it  believes  the  objective of  full employment  to  be 
fundamental and the exchange rate stability irrelevant. By contrast, where a government allocates the values 
k1 =0  and  k2 =1 to the weights of the two objectives, indicates that the government's primary objective is 
the stability of the exchange rate and that full employment is unimportant (or at least unachievable). Now, 
although generalizing, we can say that in the first case we would have a government of  Keynesian economic 
culture, while in the second case it would be a government of monetarist economic culture. At the same time, 
we must not forget that there may be a case where a government intends to implement a strategy intended to 
adapt the objective of full employment  to that of exchange rate stability, using a system of fluctuating 
exchange rates around the rate of exchange of reference. In this case it could be said that 0< k1<1  and   
0< k2<1, with the constraint k1+ k2 = 1. This last case could be that of the monetary rules used at the time of 
the EMS. 
The  allocation  of  weights  in  the  form  described  just  above  may  suggest  that  the  two  objectives  are 
independent;  in  fact,  in  the  case  of  a  Keynesian  type  approach,  they  may  be  parameterized  to  a  third 
alternative, that is, the national inflation rate, j p’, in the sense that it is assumed that the movements of such a 
rate of inflation are positively correlated to movements in the level of employment and negatively correlated 
to movements in the balance of payments. In short, we can say that the exchange rate, e, is a function of the 
relationship between the national inflation rate, j p’, and the rate of inflation of the partner countries, w p’; 
equally  briefly,  we  can  assume  that  the  level  of  the  national  income,  Y,  and  therefore  the  level  of 
employment, L, are functions, all other conditions being equal, of the national inflation rate, j p’. This can be 
written as: 
 
    [ 1 ]        e = f (j p’/w p’) 
    [ 2 ]        L = g (j p’) 
 
 
If you assume that  w p’= cost, then the system represented by the equations [1 ] and [ 2 ] can be solved 
parametrically with respect to j p’,  i.e. the national inflation rate. It is then possible to derive an equation that 
expresses the relationship between the level of foreign exchange and the level of employment  in a given 
country, whereby an increase in the value of the national currency in respect to a foreign currency negatively 
influences the national employment level. 
In a more strictly monetarist approach, instead, we assume that movements of the rate of inflation have 
consequences on the balance of payments and do not have lasting effects on the levels of employment. In this 
case, the only objective to be assigned a weight, and more specifically the value 1, is  x2. All other conditions 
being equal, it follows that the key variable is the rate of inflation so that if one country, in a given period of 
time, shows an inflation rate higher than that experienced in other countries, the balance of payments is a 
deficit that can be eliminated only if  adequate monetary policies and fiscal measures are adopted. This 
strategy is reverted to when it is desirable to adopt a system of fixed exchange rates. Having assumed that the 
variable around which the strategies of the governments involved in a monetary integration project revolve is 
the national inflation rate and, reverting to [1], we observe that the parity rates will be maintained only if 
 j p’ =w p’, or at most, if the national inflation rate significantly converges on the inflation rate of the partner 
countries, i.e. j p’→ w p’. Of course, this applies to countries that show structural deficits of their balance of 
payments and who, therefore, are called to implement deficit recovery policies. 
With reference to the case studied (EMS), such conditions can be outlined assuming the countries in the 
integrated monetary area concerned form two groups, namely the group of countries in surplus of their 
balances of payments and the group of countries in deficit of their balance of payments. The first countries 
show low inflation propensities and the second show higher inflation propensities. To simplify, the first 
group of countries is represented by a single country-type just as the second group of countries is. Therefore, 
the problem is reduced to the relationship between the exchange rates of the two country-types and attention 
focuses on the inflation recovery strategies adopted by the country with higher inflation and in the keeping, 
in time, to such strategies.   8 
 
 
6. Controlling inflation, cognitive biases and decisional failures   
 
In  the  situation  formulated  above,  the  country  that  must  implement  measures  to  adjust  its  balance  of 
payments is the country with greater inflationary propensity indicated with A, whose government, GA , must 
engage in a programme focused on the objective of reducing the national inflation rate, making it converge 
on the country with the lower rate of inflation. This is a commitment that GA  makes when drawing up a 
programme, usually multiperiodal, which entails estimating both the expected value of some fundamental 
economic data and the capacity of GA to keep to its own programme. The estimates of GA are based on a set 
of information conditioned by the nature of the inflationary process that characterizes the economy of A and, 
therefore, by the operations that the government will have to implement. It is assumed that the conditions in 
which GA moves are characterised by bounded rationality and therefore the forecasts that each Government 
makes will have a limited time horizon and the multiperiodal plans will take place in a sequence of periods. 
At the same time, it can be assumed that the forecasts of GA   are affected by cognitive biases that entail 
inevitable forecasting errors. We know from cognitive science that one of the causes of forecasting errors can 
be the overestimation of low risks and the underestimation of higher risks (Gigerenzer, 2007:  66). 
In the finance field, forecasting errors are largely also made by experts to whom, in many cases, a kind of 
“overconfidence in predictions" (Hilton, 2003:277) can be attributed. It has been noted that "people are more 
confident, for example, in the accuracy of others' responses than in the accuracy of their own responses” 
(Eply, 2007:247). Nor can we ignore the fact that agents and experts tend to overestimate their own ability to 
govern the processes that they themselves set in motion (Rachlinski, 2007: 577). On experts’ forecasting 
errors we refer you to Camerer (1981), Russo and Schoemaker (1991).  In regard to balance of payments, 
governments rely largely on the experts of central banks and other international economic organizations, 
adding their likely forecasting errors to the forecasting errors that governments themselves make in terms of 
reliability of their future conduct. In support of the theory that economic and monetary policy strategies may 
be affected by assessment and forecasting errors we refer to Phelps (1983) who showed that fully rational 
expectations are not particularly credible in situations where optimum individual actions depend not only on 
the beliefs of the individuals themselves, but also on their belief on the beliefs of others. A forecasting error 
that  a  government  can  make  is  on  the  differential  that  may  occur  in  the  short/medium  term  between 
productivity growth and growth of the monetary base. It was Friedman (1959) himself who emphasised how 
it is not possible in the short/medium term, by the authorities which oversee economic policy, to accurately 
forecast the relation between money stocks, prices levels and the level of the national product. 
The monetary base can grow at a greater rate than the average productivity of the national economic system 
if the government is induced to create liquidity and, if anything, to inefficiently allocate the resources it 
receives from the fiscal system, directing that allocation to the attainment of adequate social consensus in the 
short/medium  term.  Harrod  (1972:  44),  dwelling  on  the  sociopolitical  bases  of  inflation  in  the  period 
concerned, at that time said "the new wage-price explosion is altogether unprecedented….. the causes of 
which  are  sociological”.  According  to  this  approach,  inflation  is  analysed  essentially  as  a  monetary 
phenomenon  (Laidler  and  Parkin,  1975:741).  Indeed,  according  to  Friedman  "inflation  is  always  and 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon..... and can be produced only by a more rapid increase in the quantity of 
money than in the output" (Friedman, 1970:24).  However, if inflation also expresses itself through monetary 
dynamics, then from a national inflationary process continued over time, the strength of contractual rules 
established in the national labour market must be identified, beyond the veil of monetary policy. However, if 
the government of a country that has a greater inflationary propensity compared to other countries, decides to 
adopt a fixed exchange rate system, it does so on the basis of being able to estimate the immediate and future 
advantages arising from the stability of its currency against the immediate and future disadvantages related to 
the choice of such an economic policy (reduction of the growth rate of employment). 
With reference to the case of the EMS, Paul Krugman (1995: ch.7) notes that the European governments 
with high inflationary propensity committed an error in assessing their ability to politically manage the 
consequences of structural rigidities in the national budgets. In fact, according to Krugman, the planners of 
the  EMS  trusted  in  the  theories  according  to  which  unemployment  would  be  eliminated  thanks  to  the 
flexibility of prices and wages obtained with operations that were assumed politically inexpensive; but this 
did not happened. Thus, there is a sort of asymmetry in the estimation of expected results; an asymmetry 
analogous with what is  normally called "myopia" and arising from the tendency of individuals to act in the 
light of their short term interests instead of extending their time horizons to the maximum (Elster, 1992: 35).   9 
As Zaleskiewicz (2006: 712) noted "psychologists have shown that most people tend to overestimate the 
likelihood  of  positive  outcomes  and  underestimate  the  likelihood  of  negative  outcomes”.  This  is  a 
phenomenon that cognitive psychologists call myopic discounting. Recalling Winston and Woodbury (1991), 
who,  in  turn,  refer  to  Strotz  (1956)  said,  "a  myopic  discount  function  'overvalues'  the  more  proximate 
satisfactions relating to the more distant ones […. ]. With a myopic discount function, their relative present 
values do depend on the time perspective τ from which this valuation is made" (Winston and Woodbury, 
1991: 328-9). All the more reason that the asymmetry in estimations is reinforced by the fact that the positive 
effects seem to materialise in the proximate time period, termed  ∆t1 , while the negative effects seem to 
materialise in a more distant period, termed ∆t2 . A little like the case of someone who is in debt and 
underestimates the difficulty they will have in the future to honour the debt. 
 
 
7. Inflation targeting and myopic utility functions  
 
Underestimation of the negative consequences expected in the subsequent period, ∆t2, of an action carried 
out  in  the  current  period,  ∆t1,  leads  to  behaviour  that  manifests  anomalies,  in  respect  to  the  principles 
governing Olympic rationality, amongst which the stability of preferences in time is the assumed focal point, 
characterised by a discount rate that is constant in time. (Klochko and Ordershook, 2005: 4). In this paper, 
however, it is assumed that the preferences defined in the space of economic policies, and amongst these 
those of exchange rates, can, due to the effects of agent’s forecasting errors and the effects of regret, change 
what may occur in the period following that in which an economic policy decision was taken.  
We know that a country with a structural deficit of its balance of payments, at least in the short/medium 
term, must implement a policy of inflation control if it wishes to maintain its exchange rate stable. In a 
slightly simplistic way, it can be expressed as deflationary policies; in actual fact, the concept of deflation is 
a little ambiguous, if by deflation, a pure and simple decrease in the general level of prices (Siklos, 2005) is 
intended. This concept can be supplemented with a policy geared to progressively reducing the growth rate 
of prices; such a policy has, de facto, the nature of inflation targeting. In its "powerful" version, inflation 
targeting consists of establishing mandatory rules to control inflation. In the "weak" version, it consists of 
establishing a framework to derive a flexible or discretionary monetary policy (Bemanke et al, 1999:4). It 
goes without saying that an inflation targeting policy must be based on an adequate understanding of the 
forces that determine inflation and, above all else, the cause of the (positive) inflation differential of the 
country that shows the balance of payments deficit. We suppose this to be country A. From a short/medium-
term perspective, the changes in the general level of prices in A are conditioned, ceteris paribus, by the 
relationship between wage dynamics and the dynamics of average labour productivity. In this case, inflation 
is substantially determined by social and institutional factors, i.e. by the wage negotiations between the 
social partners and the rules of tax policy and public expenditure management on the part of GA. 
As is known, a scheme designed to represent the inflationary process of a country open to international trade 
is that which is based on the Scandinavian inflation model (Kierzkowsky,1976). In this model, the key 
sectors of national economies are divided into two main categories, namely the category of sectors that 
compete in the international market and the category of sectors that do not compete, which are protected. 
In  the  standard  Scandinavian  model,  it  is  assumed  that  in  the  sectors  open  to  international  trade, 
characterized by higher levels of average labour productivity, the wages tend to grow faster than wages 
earned in protected sectors, characterized by a slower growth of average labour productivity. In fact, the 
Scandinavian model is intended to represent a process of imported inflation by the stimulus that the wages of 
the most dynamic sectors exercise on the wages of less dynamic sectors. The Scandinavian model however 
belongs to the broader family of structural inflation models (Frisch, 1983: 5), in which the rigidity of wages 
in the low growth sectors of the average labour productivity, plays an important part. However, I believe we 
can  reverse  the  hypothesis  that  is  the  basis  of  the  relationship  of  dependency  of  the  wages  of  low-
productivity sectors from the salaries of the highest productivity sectors, assuming the wages of the first 
sectors (such as public employment, some types of professions, some commercial activities) are considered 
"independent  variables",  whilst  the    salaries  of  open  sectors  are  considered  dependent  variables.  This 
happens, in particular, if the recipients of wages of low-productivity sectors are able to influence policy 
decisions on the allocation of the national income. 
In  this  case,  the  growth  rate  of  wages  is  parameterized  on  the  wages  of  the  protected  sectors  and  is 
independent of the growth rates of productivity in the sectors concerned. This leads to an inflationary gap 
determined by the differential between the rate of growth of the average level of wages and the rate of   10 
growth of average labour productivity. The structural characteristics of such a labour market reflect the 
structural  features  of  institutional  relations  governing  the  negotiation  of  pay  levels.  It  follows  that  an 
inflation targeting policy should be accompanied by an income policy, intended however as a policy capable 
of linking the rate of wage increase of the protected sectors to the rate of increase in labour productivity in 
these sectors. 
In other words, it would be a policy that is able to affect the national income distribution mechanisms, 
altering  the  previous  structure  of  that  distribution.  It  supposes  a  situation  of  fixed  exchange  rates  and 
assumes that the government implements a policy aimed at redressing the balance of payments that is in 
deficit because of a positive differential between the growth rate in wages and the growth rate of average 
labour  productivity  that  is  generated  in  ∆t1.  In  the  period  considered,  such  a  policy  generates  specific 
cognitive dynamics in monetary recipients; dynamics that can lead to the reversal of preferences between  
exchange rate stability and inflation reduction. Reversing the preferences, or inconsistency between plans 
and  effective  actions,  is  an  area  of  investigation  on  which  economists  have  measured  themselves  and 
cognitive psychologists  offered economists some important models of interpretation of the phenomenon 
(Kahneman,  1994).  The  diversity  of  models  is  a consequence  of  the  different  ways  in  which  cognitive 
processes intervene and through which the subjects interpret and represent the phenomena that condition 
their decisions (Hsee, Zhang and Chen, 2007). Of particular interest is an interpretative scheme called impact 
bias (Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999; Kahneman, 2000; Wilson and Gilbert, 2003). The impact bias can 
emerge when agents, after having completed an action, change the expectations relative to the effects of this 
action.  In  contrast,  in  the  case  of  negative  consequences  expected  in  ∆t2,  it  can  produce,  in  ∆t1,  an 
underestimation of the consequences. Only when the agents have reached ∆t2  can they revise their opinions 




8. The problem of choice in temporary equilibria  
 
Just above, reference is made to the features that an economic policy should have that is geared to ensure -
through the governance of inflation- the exchange rate stability. Of course, the effects of this policy should 
be considered in their own time dimension and can be divided into two groups of effects: those in the short 
term, and those in the medium term, according to an approach based on the role of bounded rationality, 
where there is no room for long-term analysis. The short-term effects are correlated to monetary measures 
aimed at exchange rate stability, while those in the medium term are manifested through a reduction in the 
level of employment. Of course, the consequences of an eventual adaptation of the real economy to the new 
governance of inflation have not yet manifested themselves. 
In fact, transformations of the real economic system are subject to inertial forces that will manifest their 
effects in a longer time period, beyond the short term. It can therefore be said that it is the positive effects, 
which the deflationary policy produces on foreign exchange, that are mainly emphasized in the short term, 
while in the medium term, it is mainly the negative effects on employment levels that are emphasised. As it 
is the positive effects nearest to the time with which the decision maker draws up his plans, the result is an 
overestimation of the positive effects and the underestimation of the negative future effects. The distinction 
between the short and medium-term effects allows subdividing the timeliness within which the function of 
collective utility of GA in more periods, is expressed. For simplicity let us suppose that there are two periods 
i.e. ∆t1  and  ∆t2.  In ∆t1  the decision maker GA   is having to assess in particular, the positive effects of 
stabilization of the exchange rate, overestimating them; he therefore assigns a high enough value to weight k1 
and underestimates the negative effects that occur in ∆t2; and consequently will assign a relatively low value 
to weight k2. 
If, on first inspection it immediately appears that it is possible to represent, in a more formalized way, the 
transition  from  one  institutional  condition  to  another,  making  recourse  to  an  approach  that  recalls  the 
temporary equilibrium scheme, it should be noted that there are some differences between the temporary 
equilibrium  approach  of  Lindahl-Hicks  (Lindahl,  1929;  Hicks,  1939),  subsequently  formalized  by 
Grandmont (1988), and the scheme that I here present. However, the unifying element between the Lindahl-
Hicks-Grandmont scheme and that which is used in this work, is that the decision maker, GA, takes his 
decisions sequentially in time and that these decisions cover two distinct periods, with the possibility that the 
agents modify their preferences from one period to another. Using the temporary equilibrium approach,   11 
representation of both the situation that has characterized the period of stabilization of the exchange rate and 
the situation that has characterized the period successive to exiting from the EMS, is immediate. 
The transition from one period to the other is therefore marked by the change of rules, consisting of a change 
in weight of the strategic objectives that express the function of the collective preference of GA. 
We assume GA must maximize a defined expected utility function, as mentioned, on the possible strategies, 
K, sub-divisible into two spaces,  K1 and K2, where K1  represents the specae on which the strategy to 
promote full employment takes its values, and K2 represents the space on which the strategy to encourage the 
exchange rate stability takes its value. These values are defined on the partition of the real numbers that 
range from 0 to 1; each basket of strategies used by GA is definable on the space identified by the Cartesian 
product  K1  X  K2 = Ai, where i=1,2 show the periods concerned. A1 therefore indicates the basket of 
strategies in ∆t1 and A2  the basket of strategies planned in ∆t1  for ∆t2. For the period ∆t1, having been given 
a signal s1  S1  the government, GA, chooses a strategy a1 in A1. Furthermore, in ∆t1  the government can 
choose a plan represented by a measurable function a2 (.) from S2  in  A2, which describes the choice a2 (s2 ) 
that they intend to make in ∆t2  if estimating the signal s2  in that period. The constraints which GA will face 
may depend on its current and future environment and from the action chosen in ∆t1, and are represented by 
a1 (s1 ) β2 (a1 ,s1 ,s2 ). GA must maximize a intertemporal utility function. In fact, the strategy utility 
function becomes a function of expected utility, u(.), in the sense of Von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944), 
which is a real variable function defined on the connected space of strategies. It follows that u(.) determines 
a complete pre-order on that space that depends entirely on the order of the preferences of GA. The decisional 
problem of GA is to describe a choice between a simultaneous action to be carried out in the current period 
and a plan to be implemented in the successive period (Grandmont, 1982:884). 
Therefore, GA makes a prediction that takes the form of a distribution probability on S2. It can then be 
defined as an expectation function, ψ, that takes its values on the space of the probability functions  M(S2 ) 
on S2. Therefore, GA, because it knows s1, will execute both the choice of a1 and that of a2 (.) so that the 
distribution of probability induced on the space of the relations of preference, R , maximizes its preferences. 
 
       [ 3 ]                    v(c1  ,c2  )  =     u(λ(a1 ,a2 (.)))dψ(s1 )   
                                                            S2                                                     
 
Where λ is a suitable parameter, while a1 =k1 x1  e  a2 = k2 x2 . 
The baskets of possible strategies, ai , for each period are parameterized with respect to the weights assigned 
to their objectives. We imagined that GA would increase the weight of the policies to contain inflation, and 
therefore, following what was said above, it is considered that it intends to plan, for ∆t2, a decrease in the  
weight of k1 and an increase in that of k2;, namely altering through the change of weights, their preferences of 
strategies. By way of an example, imagine that in [ 3 ]  a1  and  a2 , in ∆t1 , have the following structure 
 
         [ 4 ]                 a1,1  =(0,5 x1 ,  0,5 x2 )          a2,1 = (0,2 x1 , 0,8 x2 ) 
 
The diversity of the structures of a1  and  a2  shows that GA intends to strengthen, in ∆t1  for ∆t2 , the policies 
that allow greater control of the deficit of the balance of payments, namely the deflationary policies. In 
contrast, on reaching ∆t2, forces of a social nature occur, which prevent GA  from reaching the target set so 
that, in  ∆t2 , a2  the following structure may present itself 
 
         [ 5 ]                                 a2,2  = ( 0,6 x1  , 0,4 x2 )  
 
In this case, the economic policies pursued by GA failed to change the structure of the distribution of income 
and to act on average labour productivity jointly with the average level of wages. This is a phenomenon that 
may be, at least in the abstract, assimilated to that of addiction, in respect of which a subject contradicts with 
their actual behaviour in a given period, the commitments undertaken with self, in a previous period. 
The addiction therefore is explained as a contradiction between plans devised and effective behaviour. In the 
same way that some cases, and more precisely in those that have to deal with an imperfectly anticipated 
inflation,  indicate a certain incapacity of one or more of the governments to control inflation, under the 
pressure of a number of forces of a social order. In fact the causes of an inflationary process can be manifold; 
however, this work is focused on the type of inflation which is determined by the choices of economic and 
monetary policies of governments, in that we are not as interested in the inflation processes themselves, as in   12 
those that are not fully controllable by the governments and which, for that reason, bring into question the 
effectiveness of the commitments made in favour of stability. 
Well, from an institutional viewpoint we can assume that the persistent deficit in balance of trade and 
payments of country A in respect of country B is due to a negative difference in productivity not corrected by 
an appropriate negative gap in wage levels. These differences in productivity may occur especially if in 
country A  significant segments of the labour market exist that are protected by foreign competition, where 
the monetary wages are established irrespective of the levels of productivity of those sectors, according to an 
approach that to some extent is inspired by the Scandinavian inflation theory. Situations of this kind can also 
be created by virtue of the existence of collective bargaining rules that do not respect a more urgent principle 
of labour efficiency and the allocation of financial resources. The habits in labour market management are 







The  objective  of  this  work  is  to  offer  an  interpretative  model  of  the  change  of  international  economic 
institutions using the experience of the EMS by way of verification. The breaking of rules based on a system 
of fixed exchange rates, but oscillating within a determined range of fluctuations, leads some governments to 
surrender to inflationary influences. This happens for reasons that are exogenous to economic logic, that is, 
for social and political reasons. However, when it happens, the effects are economic in nature and result in a 
drive to exit from the rules established. In this analysis we refer to cognitive science concepts and methods 
mainly because it is considered that the creation of expectations and regret belong to the sphere of these 
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